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ABSTRACT 
  In recent years, commentators have complained about what they 
regard as an increasingly dysfunctional confirmation process for 
judges and high-ranking executive officials, and the proper role for 
the Senate in the confirmation process has been much debated. This 
Article suggests that confirmations have been contentious throughout 
American history, and that the focus on ideological issues in today’s 
confirmation proceedings is not anomalous. Indeed, historically, both 
Republicans and Democrats have used the confirmation process to 
delay or oppose nominations when the President hails from a 
different political party, and, sometimes, even when the President 
comes from the same party but there are ideological objections to the 
nominee. 
  That the appointments process has, at times, been difficult and 
contentious should come as no great surprise. The Framers of the 
United States Constitution intentionally created a governmental 
structure that was more prone to obstructionism than other 
comparable systems. Relying on concepts like “separation of powers,” 
and “checks and balances,” the Framers sought to constrain the 
federal government in ways that would limit the possibilities for 
governmental abuse. The appointments power reflects this approach. 
Like many other constitutional powers, it is a shared power. Although 
the President has the power to nominate Article III judges, as well as 
ambassadors and “officers,” nominees can only be confirmed with the 
“advice and consent” of the Senate. By placing the power to appoint 
in two politically elected entities, the Constitution establishes a system 
whereby political influences will sometimes have a major impact on 
the confirmation process.  
  Although contentiousness can arise during any type of nomination, 
some Supreme Court nominations have been particularly bitter. Both 
the Senate and the American public have increasingly become aware 
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that the courts make law and that the political and judicial attitudes of 
nominees matter. Under such circumstances, the Senate’s inquiry 
quite naturally goes beyond the simple question of whether a nominee 
is qualified or unqualified. However, the confirmation process is 
more difficult today, even for nonjudicial nominees, because of the 
bitter partisanship that has infected the U.S. political system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Robert Bork’s failed nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987 
ignited a firestorm of controversy over the Senate’s role in the judicial 
confirmation process.1 Rather than focusing on Bork’s qualifications, 
which were impressive given his background as a Yale law professor 
and a federal judge,2 Bork’s nomination was derailed because of his 
 
 1. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 281–84 (5th ed. 2008); see 
also generally David J. Danelski, Ideology as a Ground for the Rejection of the Bork 
Nomination, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 900 (1990) (discussing competing visions of the role of the 
Senate in the confirmation process as it related to the Bork nomination); Orrin G. Hatch, The 
Dangers of Political Law, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1338, 1338–39 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1989)) (“Judge 
Bork’s opponents did not want a judge who would religiously follow the words of the 
Constitution and federal laws—instead, they preferred a judge who would follow his own heart. 
Moreover, they hoped that the judge’s heart would beat to the rhythm of their own political 
drums. In legal matters, Judge Bork neither followed his heart nor strove to synchronize his 
political preferences to those of a majority of the Senate. Thus he lost.”).  
 2. See Terrance Sandalow, The Supreme Court in Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1300, 1304 
(1990) (reviewing ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA (1989)) (“To be sure, Bork’s professional credentials and intellectual 
qualifications were outstanding, as impressive as those of any nominee in a good many years 
and more impressive than most.”). 
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ideological views.3 Some Senate observers feared that the Senate’s 
repudiation of the Bork nomination would lead to a politically 
charged confirmation process, involving strident attacks on nominees 
that were designed to demonstrate their unfitness for Senate 
confirmation.4 Some have termed this process “Borking,”5 and others 
have lamented what they perceive as the politics of personal 
destruction.6 
Although the Bork nomination was certainly contentious in 1987, 
the confirmation process may be even more dysfunctional today. The 
Senate has stalled President Barack Obama’s nominations to the 
federal courts, as well as his nominations to executive-branch and 
ambassadorial positions.7 At one point, fifty-nine of Obama’s 
nominees to executive-branch positions and seventeen of his 
nominees to the federal judiciary were awaiting confirmation votes.8 
 
 3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial Ethics, 2 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 643, 646 (1989) (“Judge Bork was attacked for his writings criticizing Supreme 
Court cases protecting the right of privacy, applying the equal protection clause to gender 
discrimination, and using the First Amendment to protect speech not concerned with the 
political process.”); Danelski, supra note 1, at 900 (“Opponents of Robert H. Bork’s nomination 
did not question his personal integrity or his professional qualifications . . . . [T]hey objected to 
his constitutional views and for that reason sought to prevent his confirmation. Their premise 
was that ideology is a permissible ground for rejecting a Supreme Court nominee.”).  
 4. See Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin’, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1323 (2007) 
(reviewing RICHARD DAVIS, ELECTING JUSTICE: FIXING THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATION 
PROCESS (2005) and RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES (2006)) (“[Richard] Davis claims 
that ‘[i]n a sense, selecting Justices for the Supreme Court is an election without the voters.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting DAVIS, supra, at 9)); see also H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. 
Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 641, 673 (2004) (“The 
hearings on Bork’s nomination . . . gave the entire nation a basic and easily understood lesson in 
Legal Realism 101.”); Senate Committee Hearings on the Judicial Nomination Process, 50 
DRAKE L. REV. 429, 504 (2002) (“Over the years, people from time to time have objected to 
judicial nominees on the ground that their legal views were extreme. But until now, they have 
saved ‘Borking’ for an unlucky few.”). 
 5. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 1316; see also David Greenberg, Op-Ed., ‘Borking’ Before 
Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, at A31 (describing opposition to Supreme Court nominees 
before Bork that was based on the nominees’ beliefs or identities rather than their 
qualifications). 
 6. See, e.g., James E. DiTullio & John B. Schochet, Note, Saving This Honorable Court: A 
Proposal to Replace Life Tenure on the Supreme Court with Staggered, Nonrenewable Eighteen-
Year Terms, 90 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1140 (2004) (“The Senate confirmation process for Supreme 
Court nominees has become more contentious over the course of the last several decades.”); 
Richard Lavco, Washington Burning, TIME, Jan. 4, 1999, at 66 (“Clinton’s impeachment is the 
latest episode in the intensification of congressional partisanship that dates back at least to the 
Democrat-controlled Senate’s 1987 rejection of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court.”). 
 7. Jeremy W. Peters, Senate Vote Curbs Filibuster Power to Stall Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2013, at A1. 
 8. Id. 
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Senate Democrats became so frustrated that they decided to alter the 
filibuster rules. Instead of requiring a supermajority of sixty senators 
to halt a filibuster,9 the Senate adopted rules requiring only a simple 
majority to cut off debate for all presidential appointments except 
Supreme Court nominees.10 This change angered Senate 
Republicans,11 prompting them to use other tactics to slow the 
confirmation process.12 Although the rules change has led to the 
confirmation of more nominees, even after the filibuster change, 
many positions remained unfilled. For example, at one point, there 
were still more than thirty ambassadorial posts that remained unfilled 
even though nominations for those slots had been pending in the U.S. 
Senate for some time.13 
The proper role for the Senate in the confirmation process has 
been a subject of much debate. Should the Senate focus only on 
whether a nominee is qualified or unqualified, or should the Senate 
also consider a nominee’s ideological perspectives (or, perhaps, other 
issues)? Historically, it has not been unusual for confirmation 
proceedings to focus on ideological issues.14 Indeed, both Republicans 
and Democrats have used the confirmation process to delay or 
oppose nominations when the President hails from a different 
political party, and sometimes, even when the President comes from 
the same party but there are ideological objections to the nominee.15 
Although at times the Senate has played a more limited role in the 
confirmation process, there are other periods when the confirmation 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. (“Republicans accused Democrats of irreparably damaging the character of an 
institution that in many ways still operates as it did in the 19th century, and of disregarding the 
constitutional prerogative of the Senate as a body of ‘advice and consent’ on presidential 
nominations.”). 
 12. Kristina Peterson, Senate Differences Stall Nominees: Partisan Disputes Create Backlog 
Among Would-Be Ambassadors as GOP Blocks Procedural Shortcuts, WALL ST. J., June 28, 
2014, at A5. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: 
SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS NOT CONFIRMED, 1789-2007, at 7–12 (2008) (listing nominees 
that failed due to “[o]pposition to the [n]ominee’s [v]iews”); see also RICHARD S. BETH & 
BETSY PALMER, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE, 1789-2011, at 1 (2011). 
 15. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 7–12; see also William Safire, Op-Ed., Battle of the Blue 
Slips, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33 (describing the Senate practice of “blue-slipping” 
nominees, which allows individual senators to block nominees for positions in their home 
states). 
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process has been extremely contentious.16 During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, for example, there were a number of battles 
regarding Supreme Court nominees, and those battles regularly 
focused on the nominee’s views.17 
The fact that the appointments process has, at times, been 
difficult and contentious should come as no great surprise. The 
Framers intentionally created a governmental system that was more 
prone to obstruction than comparable systems. Relying on concepts 
like separation of powers18 and checks and balances,19 the Framers 
sought to constrain governmental powers in ways that would limit the 
possibilities for governmental abuse.20 The appointments power 
reflects this approach. Like many other constitutional powers, it is a 
shared power.21 Although the President has the power to nominate 
Article III judges, as well as ambassadors and “officers,” nominees 
can only be confirmed with the “advice and consent” of the Senate.22 
 
 16. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 7–12.  
 17. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 4–7.  
 18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES: THE CLASHES AND THE COMPROMISES THAT 
GAVE BIRTH TO OUR FORM OF GOVERNMENT 6 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (“Also, mindful of 
colonial experience and following the arguments of Montesquieu, the idea that the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers had to be ‘separated,’ made to ‘check and balance’ each other in 
order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 490–91 (2010) (striking down a statute governing the 
removal of Board members as a violation of the “Constitution’s separation of powers”); 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“[T]his system of division and separation of powers 
produces conflicts at times . . . , but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, 
vigorous . . . debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the 
operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power.”).  
 19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011) (“[I]ndividuals, too, are protected by the operations of separation of 
powers and checks and balances . . . .”); Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 500 (referring to the 
system of checks and balances); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234–35 (1993) (referring 
to the “Framers’ insistence that our system be one of checks and balances”). 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison); THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 18, at xv. Compare U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8 (articulating Congress’s enumerated legislative authority), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 
(providing for the President’s role in the legislative process which involves approval or 
disapproval of legislation passed by Congress, as well as for so-called “pocket vetoes”). 
 21. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, . . . [to] nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
 22. Id. 
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By placing the power to appoint in two politically elected entities, the 
Constitution establishes a system whereby political influences will 
sometimes have a major impact on the confirmation process. 
Although contentiousness can arise with regard to any type of 
nomination, confirmation fights have been particularly bitter 
regarding some nominations to the Supreme Court. Both the Senate 
and the American public have increasingly come to realize that judges 
make law, and that the political and judicial attitudes of nominees 
matter because they provide insight into how the nominees might 
exercise their law-creating powers as judges. Under such 
circumstances, the Senate naturally inquires beyond simple questions 
as to whether a nominee is qualified or unqualified. However, the 
confirmation process is more difficult today, even for nonjudicial 
nominees, because of the bitter partisanship that has infected the U.S. 
political system. 
This Article explores the theoretical basis, history, and practices 
associated with the appointments process. Part I examines the 
philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Appointments Clause. Part II focuses on the historical realities of the 
appointments process. Parts III and IV focus, respectively, on how 
the Senate’s procedural rules have complicated the confirmation 
process, and how recent changes to these rules have affected the 
process. Finally, Part V comments on how the current political 
climate in Washington has resulted in unprecedented partisanship 
regarding appointments to nonjudicial offices. 
I.  THE PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Even though varied and sometimes conflicting ideological 
principles played a role in the framing and development of the 
Constitution,23 the founding generation was unquestionably 
influenced by the principles of the Enlightenment,24 including such 
 
 23. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
16–18 (1967) (“Study of the sources of the colonists’ thoughts as expressed in the informal as 
well as the formal documents . . . reveals, at first glance, a massive, seemingly random 
eclecticism.”). 
 24. Id. at 26–27 (“Despite the efforts that have been made to discount the influence of the 
‘glittering generalities’ of the European Enlightenment on eighteenth-century Americans, their 
influence remains . . . . The ideas and writings of the leading secular thinkers of the European 
Enlightenment . . . were quoted everywhere in the colonies . . . .”).  
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writers as John Locke,25 Thomas Paine,26 and Baron de Montesquieu.27 
Enlightenment principles were debated, discussed, and relied on to 
map out an entirely new approach to government and governmental 
authority. For example, the drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence28 implicitly rejected the concept of divine right: the idea 
that monarchs are placed on their thrones by God, are divinely 
inspired and guided, and carry out God’s will through their actions.29 
In doing so, the drafters of the Declaration of Independence seemed 
to embrace attacks on the notions of divine right30 and hereditary 
succession,31 and opted instead for a government premised on 
democratic principles: “Governments are instituted among Men, 
 
 25. See Donald L. Doernberg, “We the People”: John Locke, Collective Constitutional 
Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 52, 57, 64–65 (1985) 
(concluding that it “would be difficult to overstate John Locke’s influence on the American 
Revolution and the people who created the government that followed it”); David Thomas 
Konig, Thomas Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 
250, 262 (2008) (noting that “Jefferson followed Locke in justifying for the American colonies of 
1776 the right of armed resistance”). 
 26. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (Barnes & Noble 2005) (1776); see also Allen 
Edward Shoenberger, Connecticut Yankee in Europe’s Court: An Alternative Vision of 
Constitutional Defamation Law to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan?, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
431, 432 (2010) (“Free speech, such as that exemplified by the speeches and pamphlets of the 
revolutionary firebrand Thomas Paine, has been at the center of American civil rights.” (citing 
HARVEY J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION (2000))). 
 27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 28. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 29. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “centuries ago” there was a “belief that the monarch served by divine right”). Of course, 
part of the problem is that some major constituencies were omitted from the notion of the 
“consent of the governed.” See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that slaves, women, and those who did not 
hold property were barred from voting).  
 30. See PAINE, supra note 26, at 6 (“There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the 
composition of monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers 
him to act in cases where the highest judgment [sic] is required.”). Paine, who was born in 
England, but was in the American colonies during the Revolutionary period, wrote extensively, 
and with serious reservations, regarding the British monarchy’s claim to rule by divine right: “no 
man in his senses can say that [the British monarch’s claim to the throne] under William the 
Conquerer is a very honorable one. A French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and 
establishing himself king of England against the consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very 
paltry rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in it.” Id. at 13–14. 
 31. Even had the British monarchy been legitimately established, Paine had grave 
reservations regarding the desirability of granting the monarch the right of hereditary 
succession: “Most wise men, in their private sentiments, have ever treated hereditary right with 
contempt; yet it is one of those evils, when once established is not easily removed . . . .” Id. at 
12–13. 
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deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”32 In 
other words, power flows from the people to the government, rather 
than the other way around. 
Significantly, in terms of understanding the Advice and Consent 
Clause, although the Framers embraced democracy and the principle 
that the power to govern is rooted in the “consent of the governed,” 
many in the founding generation were highly distrustful of 
governmental power.33 As Thomas Paine argued, “Society in every 
state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a 
necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable one.”34 
Two separate and distinct reasons likely lead to this distrust of 
government. First, the newly independent Americans had recently 
revolted against the British Empire and claimed their independence 
because of alleged abuses by the English monarch.35 Second, many 
Americans had immigrated to the American colonies to escape 
religious persecution in Europe.36 In particular, they sought to escape 
“established” religions that required everyone to support those 
religions, and aggressively persecuted those who tried to practice 
other religions.37 
Even though the Declaration of Independence made clear that 
the power to govern flows from the “consent of the governed,” the 
early Americans did not unequivocally embrace government, even 
democratic government, and instead sought to limit and constrain 
governmental power. The Constitution was written at a time when 
Europe was governed primarily by monarchs, and many philosophical 
writers of the time were keenly aware of the risks that monarchies 
 
 32. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 33. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES, supra note 18, at 16 (“Uncertain that any government over so vast a domain as the 
United States could be controlled by the people, the anti-federalists saw in the enlarged powers 
of the central government only the familiar threats to the rights and liberties of the people.”). 
 34. See PAINE, supra note 26, at 3.  
 35. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶¶ 3–30 (U.S. 1776) (listing the 
grievances against the English King (although, in fact, some of the offenses had been committed 
by the British Parliament rather than the King)). 
 36. SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 490 (1902); see 
also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1947) (“A large proportion of the early settlers of 
this country came here from Europe to escape the bondage laws which compelled them to 
support and attend government-favored churches . . . .”). 
 37. COBB, supra note 36, at 490. 
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posed.38 For example, Thomas Paine argued that monarchs become 
“poisoned by importance” and ultimately are “the most ignorant and 
unfit of any throughout the dominions.”39 He goes on to note, 
How came the king by a power which the people are afraid to trust, 
and always obliged to check? Such a power could not be the gift of a 
wise people, neither can any power, which needs checking, be from 
God; yet the provision, which the [British] constitution makes, 
supposes such a power to exist.40 
In an effort to limit and control the actions of governmental 
officials, the Framers embraced the ideas of Baron de Montesquieu, 
the French philosopher, who is credited with articulating the doctrine 
of separation of powers.41 In his landmark The Spirit of the Laws, he 
articulates the theory: 
[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from 
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the 
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary 
controul; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined 
to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and 
oppression. There would be an end of every thing, were the same 
man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to 
exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing 
the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.42 
Citations to Montesquieu’s arguments regarding separation of powers 
appear in the Federalist Papers43 and the debates at the Constitutional 
Convention,44 as well as in other writings from the period.45 More 
importantly, the Constitution embraces the doctrine of “separation of 
powers” throughout.46 For example, although Congress has the power 
 
 38. See PAINE, supra note 26, at 14 (“As the exalting one man so greatly above the rest 
cannot be justified on the equal rights of nature, so neither can it be defended on the authority 
of scripture; for the will of the Almighty . . . expressly disapproves of government by kings.”).  
 39. Id. at 21. 
 40. Id. at 11. 
 41. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (Cosimo 2011) (1748). 
 42. Id. at 154. 
 43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).  
 44. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
DEBATES, supra note 18, at 85, 237, 249, 253, 260, 288, 339, 360.  
 45. See id. at 159–60, 163, 166–67, 240, 247, 259–60, 357. 
 46. See id. at 6 (“Also, mindful of colonial experience and following the arguments of 
Montesquieu, the idea that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers had to be ‘separated,’ 
made to ‘check and balance’ each other in order to prevent tyranny, gained wide acceptance.”). 
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to enact legislation, the Constitution requires the President’s 
signature as a prerequisite to enactment (unless Congress overrides 
the President’s veto or the President allows the act to become law 
without his signature).47 Likewise, although Congress and the 
President jointly enact legislation, the judiciary is frequently charged 
with interpreting that legislation, and sometimes in striking it down as 
unconstitutional.48 Moreover, the President and Congress share many 
powers in the realm of foreign affairs. The Constitution gives the 
President the power to negotiate treaties, but the power to ratify rests 
with the Senate;49 only Congress can declare war,50 but the President is 
integrally involved in other foreign affairs issues.51 In addition, the 
Framers created different terms of office for different officials so that 
a single election could not dramatically shift the course and direction 
of government.52 
Interestingly, even though the Framers may have viewed the 
separation of powers principles as a sufficient check on governmental 
abuse, the founding generation did not agree. Reflecting the 
skepticism and distrust discussed earlier, they demanded additional 
protections. When the Framers decided not to include a bill of rights 
in the Constitution, believing they had created a government of 
limited and enumerated powers, the people of the new nation 
 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the 
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be 
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be 
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate 
and House of Representatives . . . .”).  
 48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–78 (1803). 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur.”). 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 11 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare 
War.”). 
 51. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 52. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, 
chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office 
during the Term of four Years.”); see also THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 18, at 8 (“Thus, for example, even 
though an upper and a lower house of the legislature might each eventually derive from the 
people, different districts, different terms of office, different modes of election, and different 
definitions of authority would create balances of power.”).  
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disagreed.53 It rapidly became clear that the Constitution might not 
have enough support to gain ratification without the addition of a 
formal bill of rights.54 In an effort to salvage the process, proponents 
urged ratification of the Constitution as drafted, but promised that 
the first Congress would create what became the Bill of Rights.55 Only 
then was ratification possible.56 As a result, the Bill of Rights entered 
the Constitution as amendments rather than as a part of the 
Constitution itself.57 
The Appointments Clause is fully consistent with the doctrines of 
separation of powers and checks and balances. The President has the 
power to appoint “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States,” but only with the advice and consent of the Senate.58 The 
Federalist Papers explicitly refer to the Advice and Consent Clause as 
 
 53. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 122 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting) (mem.) 
(“In the Constitutional Convention the proposal for a Bill of Rights of any kind received scant 
attention. In the course of the ratification of the Constitution, however, the absence of a Bill of 
Rights was used vigorously by the opponents of the new government.” (footnote omitted)); Ex 
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 424 (1885); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92–93 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“During the debates in the Thirteen Colonies over ratification of the 
Constitution, one of the arguments frequently used by opponents of ratification was that 
without a Bill of Rights guaranteeing individual liberty the new general Government carried 
with it a potential for tyranny.”). 
 54. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1943) (“Without 
promise of a limiting Bill of Rights it is doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered 
enough strength to enable its ratification.”); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
769 (2010) (“But those who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe 
traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution.”); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92–93 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that four states refused to ratify the Constitution without the 
addition of a bill of rights); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S.105, 122 (1943); Ex parte Wilson, 
114 U.S. at 424. 
 55. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 636–37. 
 56. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“The first 10 Amendments were not enacted because the Members of the First 
Congress came up with a bright idea one morning; rather, their enactment was forced upon 
Congress by a number of the States as a condition for their ratification of the original 
Constitution.”); City of Opelika, 319 U.S. at 122; Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. at 424. 
 57. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769 (discussing the Bill of Rights as a condition for 
ratification of the Constitution, thus implying that the Bill of Rights is separate from the 
Constitution).  
 58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power . . . [to] nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
Law.”). 
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a check on the President’s appointment authority. The Federalist 
Papers contend that the consent requirement 
would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It 
would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the 
President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of 
unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from 
personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.59 
The Papers go on to note that 
a man who had himself the sole disposition of offices, would be 
governed much more by his private inclinations and interests, than 
when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the 
discussion and determination of a different and independent body, 
and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The possibility of 
rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing.60 
By requiring the Senate’s advice and consent, the Framers made it 
comparatively more difficult to appoint officials in the United States 
than in most other Western-style democracies. In England, by 
contrast, the party in power exercises broad discretion to appoint 
ministers and other officials.61 The British Prime Minister assumes 
that post either because his party holds a majority in the House of 
Commons or because his party has formed a coalition with other 
parties to produce a majority.62 As a result, if the Prime Minister 
strongly desires to make an appointment, he simply makes the 
appointment.63 If a Prime Minister’s appointments power is 
constrained, it is limited only by the rules or conventions of his party, 
as well as by other traditions and rules of British law.64 
 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 385 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  
 60. Id. 
 61. See Mark Eisen, Note, Who’s Running the Place? A Comparative Look at the 
Appointment System in the United States and Britain, and What the United States Can Learn, 30 
B.U. INT’L L. J. 295, 299 (2012). 
 62. See id. at 299 (“The PM, since 1867, has almost always been the [sic] both the ‘head of 
government and . . . leader of the majority party’ in the House of Commons, while the President 
is head of one branch of government and frequently at party-odds with one or both houses of 
Congress. The PM’s appointment power has been aggregating in him over time, to the point 
where he now enjoys a complete, though politically restricted, power to appoint.” (alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting GRAHAM P. THOMAS, PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET 
TODAY 51 (Bill Jones ed., 1998)) (citing THOMAS, supra, at 97).  
 63. See id. at 304 (“The PM appoints cabinet Ministers and appoints, or delegates to 
Ministers to appoint, various other, lower level political positions.”). 
 64. See id. at 304–08.  
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In the United States, by contrast, because the President and one 
or more houses of Congress have often been held by different 
political parties, the President’s preferred appointments are not 
always rubber-stamped, or necessarily even accepted. Although 
President Obama was relatively fortunate to have a Senate controlled 
by his own party for the first six years of his presidency, he now faces 
working with a Senate that is controlled by the opposing political 
party.65 Other recent presidents have faced a similar situation. For 
example, during parts of their presidencies, both President George W. 
Bush and President William Jefferson Clinton confronted a Senate 
controlled by the other party.66 
During periods of divided government, it is not at all surprising 
that Presidents have encountered difficulties confirming their 
nominees. Indeed, during both the Clinton and Bush presidencies, 
there were numerous confirmation battles, with the Republicans 
objecting to Clinton nominations67 and Democrats objecting to Bush 
nominations.68 However, opposition to nominees has hardly been 
limited to situations in which the presidency and the Senate are 
controlled by different political parties—there have been instances 
 
 65. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 7–12. 
 66. See id.; see also Robin Toner, Bush Agenda Now Faces Tough Sledding in Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2001, at A19 (“The shift of the Senate to Democratic control means that strong 
critics of some of Mr. Bush’s core policy proposals will now be in charge of the committees, the 
legislative calendar and much of the policy debate.”); Sean Wilentz, Letter to the Editor, The 
Battle over the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2005, at A24 (noting that the Republicans took 
control of the Senate in 1995). 
 67. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 7–12; Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial Selection 
During the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a Nuclear Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 
225 (2006); see also Editorial, Blocking Judicial Ideologues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at A24 
(stating that following George W. Bush’s election, “Senate Republicans who spent the better 
part of the past eight years stalling confirmation proceedings to block approval of President 
Clinton’s centrist judicial choices are now maneuvering to fill as many of the existing 94 judicial 
vacancies as possible while their party still controls the evenly divided chamber”); Wilentz, 
supra note 66 (noting that “the Republican majority blocked 35 percent of President Bill 
Clinton’s nominees to the federal appeals bench without giving them an up-or-down vote”). 
 68. See Slotnick, supra note 67, at 240 (“The most recent period corresponds to the six 
years of divided government in the Clinton Administration and Bush II’s first term, which saw 
two years of divided government and two years with a slight Republican majority and strong 
unified Democratic opposition.”); see also Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Seeks to Ease Rules on 
Filibusters of Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2003, at A15 (discussing Republican efforts to 
“overcome the filibusters that the Democrats have mounted to block votes on two nominees to 
the federal appellate courts”); Wilentz, supra note 66 (“By contrast, President Bush has, since 
2001, nominated 34 candidates to the federal circuit courts, 10 of whom the Democrats have 
blocked with filibusters—or just under 30 percent.”).  
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when the President’s own party has stymied presidential 
nominations.69 
Interestingly, it is not clear that the Framers were in complete 
agreement regarding the need to “check” and “balance” the 
President’s appointments power. At the Constitutional Convention, 
various proposals regarding that power were offered.70 Some 
proposals would vest the appointments power solely in the President 
for all appointments, solely in the Senate (for the appointment of 
judges), or solely in lawyers (for judges).71 Ultimately, the Framers 
settled on the advice-and-consent formulation,72 which set the stage 
for the confirmation battles that inevitably followed. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL REALITIES OF THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS 
In the course of U.S. history, the advice-and-consent formulation 
has served as a check and a balance against the President’s 
appointments power. As a general rule, the Senate is relatively 
deferential to the President’s choices regarding cabinet-level 
nominations.73 Of the hundreds of cabinet-position nominations 
between the Founding and 2011, the Senate rejected only fifteen.74 By 
contrast, the Senate has been much less deferential regarding the 
President’s nominees to the federal judiciary. During that same 
period, 36 of the 160 nominations to the Supreme Court did not make 
it through the confirmation process.75 Twelve of those nominees never 
made it out of committee to a vote on the Senate floor, and thirteen 
of those who did make it out of committee never received an up or 
down vote in the Senate.76 
This “checking” function of the advice-and-consent formulation 
is reflected in the fact that, when the President and the Senate hold 
similar ideological beliefs, Presidents have been more likely to 
 
 69. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that President Tyler’s own party 
rejected most of his Supreme Court nominations); id. at 9 (referring to President Grant’s 
nomination of Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar); id. at 10–11 (referring to President Hoover’s failed 
attempt to nominate John J. Parker to the Supreme Court); HOGUE, supra note 14, at 10. 
 70. See Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”: A 
Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110–22 (2005). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 110. 
 73. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 1.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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nominate judicial candidates who shared those beliefs.77 By contrast, 
when the President’s ideology has differed significantly from that of 
the Senate, the President has tended to moderate his selections in the 
direction of the Senate’s views in an effort to obtain confirmation for 
his choices.78 In other words, the Senate’s advice-and-consent 
authority has served as a direct check on the President’s nomination 
authority. 
While there is a tendency to assume that the Bork nomination 
sparked a new era in which the ideological views of nominees were 
subjected to greater scrutiny, that is hardly the case.79 Of the thirty-six 
nominees to the Supreme Court that were rejected between 1789 and 
2007,80 only a few were rejected as “unqualified,”81 and a number were 
rejected for ideological reasons.82 Moreover, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, well before Bork was even born, the Senate 
failed to confirm some twenty-six Supreme Court nominees, some for 
ideological reasons (as detailed more fully below).83 
In the early years of the nation, the Senate acted on most 
presidential nominations fairly quickly, sometimes within a day after 
the President transmitted the nomination to the Senate.84 For 
example, President Washington’s initial nominations to the Court 
were sent to the Senate in 1789 and all six were confirmed within two 
days.85 Even in later years, some nominees were quickly confirmed. 
 
 77. See Christine Kexel Chabot, A Long View of the Senate’s Influence over Supreme Court 
Appointments, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1229, 1232–33 (2013) (“Byron Moraski and Charles Shipan’s 
leading study considers twenty-eight persons nominated to the Supreme Court from 1949 to 
1994. They find that presidents nominate ideologically compatible Justices when they are 
‘unconstrained by the Senate.’” (footnote omitted) (citing Bryon J. Moraski & Charles R. 
Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and 
Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1077 fig.3 (1999))). 
 78. See id. at 1233 (“Constrained presidents, however, nominate Justices closer to the 
Senate’s ideology than the president would otherwise prefer.” (citing Moraski & Shipan, supra 
note 77, at 1077 fig.3)). 
 79. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 13–14; see also Greenberg, supra note 5 (“Although Mr. 
Bork’s confirmation certainly represented a major battle of the Reagan years, the campaign to 
defeat him was neither unprecedented nor illegitimate.”). 
 80. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 1. 
 81. Id. at 13–14. 
 82. Id. at 1 (“The Supreme Court nominations discussed here were not confirmed for a 
variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the nominating President, nominee’s views, or 
incumbent Court.”).  
 83. See id. at 22–30 tbl.4.  
 84. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at Summary (listing nominations and the length of 
time required to confirm them). 
 85. Id. at 4. 
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For example, the nomination of President William Howard Taft was 
received, debated, and voted on within a day.86 
Despite the quickness of the process in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, some Supreme Court nominees were withdrawn 
or rejected on ideological grounds.87 Even President Washington’s 
nominee for the position of Chief Justice was rejected in 1795 because 
of a speech that the nominee made opposing the Jay Treaty—a treaty 
supported by the Federalists, who dominated the Senate, and who 
provided thirteen of the fourteen “no” votes on the nomination. 
Another of Washington’s nominees, William Paterson, was 
withdrawn without debate.88 During the early and middle parts of the 
nineteenth century, other nominees were rejected on ideological 
grounds.89 For example, President John Quincy Adams nominated 
John Crittenden to the Supreme Court in 1828 after Andrew Jackson 
had been elected to the presidency.90 Not only did President Jackson’s 
supporters successfully oppose the nomination,91 but the Senate also 
decided that it was not even required to consider and vote on the 
nomination.92 In addition, Alexander Wolcott’s nomination to the 
Court in 1811 was rejected by the Senate.93 
From 1835 to 1867, the nomination process became more formal, 
with judicial nominations being initially referred to the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary.94 Once a nomination was reported out of 
the Committee to the full Senate, the nomination generally received 
an up-or-down vote by the full Senate within a day.95 However, during 
President John Tyler’s presidency in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the Senate rejected eight of his nine nominations to the 
Supreme Court (the only nominee who was confirmed was Samuel 
Nelson in 1845).96 Although President Tyler was a Whig, he had 
 
 86. Id. at 3. 
 87. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 8–12. 
 88. Id. at 8; see also id. at 22 tbl.4 (“Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789–
2007.”).  
 89. Id. at 9–10. 
 90. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 4. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 4–5. 
 93. Id. at 4. 
 94. See id. at 5.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
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strained relations with his own party.97 Tyler had been elected to the 
Vice-Presidency, and became President when President William 
Henry Harrison died only thirty-one days into his term.98 Following 
Harrison’s death, all but one of Harrison’s cabinet members resigned, 
and Tyler was eventually expelled from the Whig party.99 
Accordingly, it came as no great surprise that Tyler had difficulty 
obtaining confirmation for his appointees following the expulsion.100 
Four of his nominees were tabled with no further action, and one was 
outright rejected.101 
Other Presidents’ Supreme Court nominations encountered 
similar difficulties. For example, President Millard Fillmore’s 
nomination of George E. Badger in 1853 was stalled for a 
considerable period of time and ultimately failed.102 Fillmore, a Whig, 
was a lame-duck president who was going to be succeeded by a 
Democrat, Franklin Pierce.103 The Senate, which was controlled by 
Democrats, decided not to vote on Badger’s nomination during the 
four months remaining in Fillmore’s term, thereby allowing his 
successor, Pierce, to make the appointment.104 
By 1868, the confirmation process had become significantly more 
complex. By that time, the Senate had adopted a detailed rule 
requiring that nominations first be referred to the Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary.105 In the following decades (1868-1922), the Senate 
confirmed most nominees within a day or two after they were 
reported out of committee to the full Senate, but there were some 
exceptions.106 For example, the Senate rejected the nomination of 
Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar in 1869.107 Hoar, who was the sitting U.S. 
Attorney General at the time of his nomination, had angered senators 
with his recommendations for federal circuit-court judges.108 Although 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 7–8 (“When nominations shall be made by the President of the United States to 
the Senate, they shall . . . be referred to appropriate committees; and the final question on every 
nomination shall be ‘Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?’”).  
 106. Id. at 8. 
 107. Id. at 9. 
 108. Id. 
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most senators had preferred nominees for those judgeships, Hoar 
ignored their preferences, instead making his own recommendations, 
and President Grant routinely chose Hoar’s recommendations over 
those of the senators.109 Moreover, Hoar’s demeanor was not 
engaging.110 Hoar’s confirmation vote was delayed for two months, 
and he was eventually voted down by a 24–33 vote.111 
During the beginning of the twentieth century, no Supreme 
Court nominees were rejected on ideological grounds.112 By this time, 
the confirmation process was becoming much more formalized.113 The 
Senate had instituted the so-called “Calendar Call” under which 
nominations that had been reported out of committee would be 
placed on the Senate’s calendar of business and would be called up in 
the order in which they appeared on the calendar.114 A nomination 
could be considered “early” (ahead of its place in the calendar) by 
unanimous consent, or a controversial nomination could be passed 
over when it’s time for consideration arrived.115 Further, although 
many Senate debates regarding Supreme Court nominations had 
previously been held in secret, they were now held in public.116 Even 
before this time, some nominations had been publicly debated in the 
Senate. For example, the 1916 nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to 
the Supreme Court encountered significant opposition,117 in part 
because of anti-Semitism and in part because of his left-leaning 
inclinations,118 and a decision was made to make the proceedings 
public.119 Nevertheless, he was confirmed by a 47–22 vote.120 
By the 1930s, the Supreme Court nomination process was 
becoming much more contentious. For example, President Herbert 
Hoover nominated John J. Parker to the Supreme Court in 1930.121 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 8–12. Although William B. Hornblower and Wheeler H. 
Peckham were rejected during this time period, both were rejected on “senatorial-courtesy” 
grounds. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
 113. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 3. 
 114. Id. at 10. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 36. 
 118. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
 119. See BETH & PALMER, supra note 14, at 10. 
 120. Id. at 36. 
 121. Id. at 10–11. 
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Even though Hoover was a Republican, and even though 
Republicans held a sizeable majority in the Senate, there was 
significant opposition to the nomination.122 The opposition focused on 
Parker’s judicial ruling on so-called “yellow dog” labor contracts 
(under which an employer could require an employee to sign a 
statement indicating that he would not join a union), and on his racist 
comments when running for the position of Governor of North 
Carolina. Parker had stated that African-Americans do not wish to 
participate in politics, and that the Republican party did not wish for 
them to do so.123 The nomination was stalled for nearly two months, 
and was ultimately rejected by a 39–41 vote.124 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s nomination of William O. 
Douglas to the Supreme Court in 1939 was also contentious.125 
Douglas’s nomination did not encounter any resistance in committee, 
but between the committee session and the floor debate, opposition 
developed surrounding Douglas’s perceived relationship with 
members of the New York Stock Exchange.126 Senator Lynn Frazier 
of North Dakota argued Douglas had an improper relationship with 
the leaders of the New York Stock Exchange. The nomination was 
passed over twice on the Call of the Calendar, in order to facilitate 
fuller debate.127 Nevertheless, the Senate ultimately confirmed 
Douglas’s nomination by a comfortable margin.128 
In the last six decades, the confirmation process has usually 
proceeded under rules that limit debate, preclude certain procedural 
actions, and do not require adherence to the Calendar Call.129 In the 
modern era, several weeks can elapse between the time that a 
nomination is made and a vote on confirmation, and the process can 
sometimes require months to complete.130 Consistent with the idea 
that the Senate takes its advice-and-consent responsibilities seriously, 
the length and scope of the review process has varied depending on 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 12. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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the nominee.131 As a Congressional Research Service report notes, 
“the Senate has reserved to itself the right to take the course of action 
that it believes best suits consideration of a particular nomination.”132 
For some nominees, the process can take place in a relatively quick 
and uncomplicated manner.133 For more controversial nominees, the 
process can be more searching and intense.134 
In a number of instances during the twentieth century, the 
Senate’s review process focused on ideological considerations. 
Indeed, a number of Supreme Court nominees were either rejected or 
not confirmed on ideological grounds, including President Johnson’s 
nomination of Abraham Fortas as Chief Justice,135 President 
Eisenhower’s nomination of John Harlan II (although he was later 
confirmed),136 and President Nixon’s nomination of Clement 
Haynsworth, Jr.137 In addition, some nominees were never reported 
 
 131. Id. As a Congressional Research Service report noted, a review of all Supreme Court 
nominations since 1789 yields two general conclusions about the procedures used. First, the 
Senate has not felt bound to consider each nomination in exactly the same way that the others 
before it were considered. Although some Supreme Court nominations, for example, never 
reached the Senate floor (and hence, did not receive a vote), the Senate spent numerous days 
debating other nominations. Neither of those practices has been routine, but their use shows 
how the Senate has reserved to itself the right to take the course of action that it believes best 
suits consideration of a particular nomination. Id. at 2. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. HOGUE, supra note 14, at 11. Although there are suggestions that other factors may 
have played a role in the rejection of Fortas as Chief Justice, some senators clearly opposed him 
because of his judicial philosophy: 
One Senator wrote that Fortas’s “judicial philosophy disqualifies him for this high 
office.” Another criticized Fortas as part of the majority on the Supreme Court led by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren (the Warren Court) making an “extremist effort . . . to set 
itself up as a super-legislature.” A third Senator also found Fortas lacking on the 
“broader question of the nominee’s judicial philosophy which includes his willingness 
to subject himself to the restraint inherent in the judicial process.” Yet another 
Senator objected to “positions taken by Justice Fortas since he went on the Supreme 
Court as Associate Justice [which had] reflected a view to the Constitution 
insufficiently rooted to the Constitution as it is written.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nomination of Abe Fortas: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. 
On the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 15–44 (1968)). 
 136. Id. at 10–11. However, in his initial nomination, the Senate failed to act before its 
special session ended. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 205 (providing background for the 
chronology of events). When he was finally considered, although he was comfortably confirmed, 
there was significant opposition. HOGUE, supra note 14, at 10–11 (“Among the objections to his 
nomination was the perception by some Senators that Harlan was ‘ultra-liberal,’ hostile to the 
South, [and] dedicated to reforming the Constitution by ‘judicial fiat.’” (quoting ABRAHAM, 
supra note 1, at 263)).  
 137. HOGUE, supra note 14, at 11 (“[O]ne Senator opposed the nomination on the basis of 
the judge’s record on civil rights issues. Furthermore, Haynsworth drew criticism from labor and 
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out of the Judiciary Committee to the floor of the Senate.138 Some of 
these nominees were resubmitted and ultimately confirmed.139 
In the last six decades, a number of confirmation proceedings 
have been contentious. For example, when President Nixon 
nominated William H. Rehnquist to be an Associate Justice in 1971,140 
questions were raised regarding his commitment to civil rights.141 
Although the Committee on the Judiciary held five days of hearings 
and opponents were able to delay a final vote for another week,142 
Rehnquist was ultimately confirmed by a sizeable majority of the 
Senate (68–26).143 The 1991 Clarence Thomas hearings were 
particularly contentious, given the allegations that he had sexually 
harassed a female colleague.144 
When a nominee’s ideological attitude might alter the ideological 
balance on the Court, the nomination sometimes assumes increased 
importance and opposition. For example, when Robert Bork was 
nominated, he would have replaced Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who 
was regarded as the swing vote on an ideologically divided Court.145 
Much of the opposition focused on Bork’s views on such hot-button 
issues as abortion and privacy.146 By contrast, although Justice Samuel 
 
minority groups on the basis of his record.” (citing REPORT TO ACCOMPANY THE NOMINATION 
OF CLEMENT F. HAYNSWORTH, JR., SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, 91st Cong., S. EXEC. 
REP. 91-12 at 24, 48)).  
 138. Id. at 17. However, the reasons vary. In the case of John Roberts, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist died while his nomination was pending, and his nomination as an associate Justice 
was withdrawn so that he could be nominated as Chief Justice. Id. In the case of some who were 
not initially reported out of committee, they were reported out during a subsequent session of 
Congress. Id. 
 139. Id. at 11. 
 140. Id. at 13. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 7–8.  
 144. Kevin T. McGuire, Book Review, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 622, 623 (1995) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRITICAL JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE 
IMPACT OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1993)). 
 145. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 281; see also Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Nomination: In 
No Time at All, Both Proponents and Opponents Are Ready for Battle: Foes on the Left 
Strive for Unity, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1987, at A24 (lending additional support for this 
proposition). 
 146. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 282–83; see also Philip Shenon, Poll Finds Public 
Opposition to Bork is Growing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1987, at A20 (“A growing number of 
Americans are expressing an unfavorable opinion of Judge Robert H. Bork after his weeklong 
testimony at Senate hearings on his nomination to the Supreme Court, a New York Times/CBS 
News Poll shows. . . . [The unfavorable response to Judge Bork] was [due to] . . . his opposition 
to Supreme Court decisions upholding abortion rights and personal privacy.”).  
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Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was the swing vote 
on the Supreme Court at the time, Alito’s perceived views did not 
thwart his nomination.147 
In summary, the history of the confirmation process reveals that 
the Bork nomination should not be regarded as aberrational. Over 
the last two-hundred-plus years of confirmation history, a number of 
nominees have been challenged (and some defeated) on ideological 
grounds. 
III.  THE SENATE’S PROCEDURAL RULES AS A  
ROADBLOCK TO CONFIRMATION 
Separation of powers does not completely explain the current 
slow down in the confirmation process. Senate procedural rules create 
additional hurdles. Indeed, for the first six years of his presidency, 
President Obama was blessed with a Senate that was controlled by his 
own political party.148 So, even though the Senate had the power to 
check Obama’s appointments, one would have expected the 
Democratically controlled Senate to largely rubber-stamp Obama’s 
wishes. Of course, that did not happen. 
A variety of Senate rules can slow or obstruct the presidential 
confirmation process. One such rule is the cloture rule that requires a 
supermajority to end a filibuster.149 The supermajority requirement 
was originally imposed by Senate Democrats who feared that 
President George W. Bush would stack the federal bench with 
 
 147. See 152 CONG. REC. 35, 41 (statement of Sen. Specter); 152 CONG. REC. 35, 52 
(statement of Sen. Durbin); 152 CONG. REC. 35, 70–72 (statement of Sen. Clinton); 152 CONG. 
REC. 35, 70–72 (statement of Sen. Specter and Sen. Leahy); 152 CONG. REC. 35, 74–75 
(statement of Sen. Kerry); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Hearings Unsettle Some 
Prevailing Wisdom About the Politics of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at A10 (“Judge 
Alito, in particular, aroused the ire of abortion rights supporters because of two memorandums 
he had written . . . [about his] disagreement with the abortion rights decisions. Abortion rights 
groups called the memorandums the most extensive written record of a Supreme Court 
nominee’s opposition to the abortion rights precedents since 1987, when the Senate rejected 
Judge Robert H. Bork.”). 
 148. See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 
WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1106; see also Michael D. Shear & Carl Hulse, G.O.P. To Act Swiftly in 
Promoting Its Agenda, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2014, at A1 (“The voting on Tuesday gave 
Republicans control of the Senate and added substantially to their majority in the House. 
Republicans won many of the most closely contested governors’ races.” (emphasis added)).  
 149. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE 
MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, at 20 (2014); see Benjamin Eidelson, Note, The Majoritarian 
Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980, 982 (2013) (emphasizing the ways in which the rule can be utilized 
to achieve certain political goals). 
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conservative appointees.150 Naturally, when President Obama took 
office, Republicans used the rule to stop his nominees.151 Because of 
the recent changes to the filibuster rule, the Senate can confirm 
presidential appointees (except for Supreme Court nominees) by a 
simple majority vote.152 With the rules change, the process has been 
returned (by and large) to the rules that applied prior to the election 
of Bush II.153 However, even after Senate Democrats altered the 
filibuster rule, fifty-nine nominations languished, including 
nominations for key ambassadorial appointments (such as Russia and 
Turkey), and a number of senior State Department officials.154 This 
delay is likely due to the fact that following the amendment of the 
filibuster rules, Senate Republicans refused to fast-track presidential 
appointees.155 
An additional obstacle is the notion of senatorial courtesy.156 In 
the nineteenth century, seven Supreme Court nominees were 
thwarted by the objections of senators from their home states.157 For 
nominations to the lower federal courts, senators can now invoke the 
so-called “blue-slip” policy that allows senators to effectively veto 
nominees from their states.158 The policy allows a senator to achieve 
that objective by failing to return the blue slip.159 The return signals 
 
 150. Charlie Savage, Despite Filibuster Limits, a Door Remains Open to Block Judge 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, at A18. 
 151. Id. (“After Mr. Obama was elected, Senate Republicans escalated the practice, 
routinely delaying the confirmation of executive branch and judicial nominees and blocking up-
or-down votes on four District of Columbia Circuit nominees.”). 
 152. Id.; see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Lex Majoris Partis: How the Senate Can End the 
Filibuster on Any Day by Simple Majority Rule, 63 DUKE L.J. 1483 (2014) (predicting, in lecture 
given before the filibuster reform, how changes to the filibuster rules would impact the 
operation of the Senate). 
 153. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, supra note 149, at 20.  
 154. Carol Giacomo, Why Doesn’t the United States Have an Ambassador in Russia?, 
TAKING NOTE (July 17, 2014, 11:25 AM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/why-
doesnt-the-united-states-have-an-ambassador-in-russia/?gwh=C7745F61EB6BEA957DEA2832
D313E1C3&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 13. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Rachel Brand, Judicial Appointments: Checks and Balances in Practice, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 47, 50 (2010); Savage, supra note 150; Wilentz, supra note 66. 
 159. See Ryan J. Owens, Daniel E. Walters, Ryan C. Black & Anthony Madonna, Ideology, 
Qualifications and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 347, 352 (“[N]ominee ideology and qualifications both independently influence whether 
Senators blue slip lower federal court nominees, with ideology playing a stronger role. [A] 
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approval of a nominee to the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, 
and a failure to return signals potential disapproval.160 However, the 
blue-slip policy only applies when both of the senators from a state 
fail to return the required blue slip.161 At one point in Senate history, 
the failure to return the blue slip meant that a nomination effectively 
died.162 Today, when neither senator returns the blue slip, the 
nominee may be accorded a Senate hearing, but the nomination will 
not advance beyond that stage.163 
Since the blue-slip policy discourages Presidents from 
nominating judges unless both home state senators agree to the 
nomination,164 the policy can force more liberal Presidents to 
nominate more conservative judges, or vice versa, in an effort to 
avoid a blue-slip veto.165 For example, in 2014 there was considerable 
controversy regarding the nomination of Michael P. Boggs, a sitting 
state judge, to a seat on a federal district court.166 In an effort to fill 
judicial vacancies in Georgia, President Obama agreed with 
Republican senators from that state to nominate various individuals 
to federal judgeships, including Boggs.167 However, Boggs ran into 
substantial opposition from Democratic interests and liberal 
activists.168 Effectively, the blue-slip policy functions as a veto.169 And 
so, in the final analysis, Senate rules have had a significant impact on 
a President’s ability to confirm his nomination choices. 
 
Senator is more likely to blue slip a lower federal court nominee who is ideologically distant 
from her than an ideologically close nominee.” (emphasis added)).  
 160. See Brand, supra note 158, at 50; see also Safire, supra note 15 (further describing this 
process).  
 161. See Safire, supra note 15. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Savage, supra note 150. 
 165. See Carl Hulse, Post-Filibuster, Obama Faces New Anger Over Judicial Choices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2014, at A14 (discussing two judicial nominees from the State of Georgia who 
were being opposed by progressive groups). 
 166. See Carl Hulse, Obama Judicial Choice Is Urged to Withdraw, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 
2014, at A19 (discussing Boggs’s nomination). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Hulse, supra note 165 (quoting Kathryn Ruemmler, White House counsel). 
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IV.  MODERN CONFIRMATION BATTLES: RECOGNITION THAT THE 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS MATTERS FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
One of the reasons that the confirmation process for judicial 
appointments has become so politicized is that the ideology of judicial 
nominees matters a great deal. Over time, Congress and the general 
public have come to realize that law is not simply a deductive process, 
that the Supreme Court “makes law,” and that the ideological views 
of those appointed to the Court affect the laws they make. The 
confirmation process simply reflects this reality, and the process has 
necessarily become more contentious. 
At one point in U.S. history, there were those who regarded law 
as a science and who believed that law should be studied by scientific 
methods.170 Christopher Columbus Langdell, an early dean of the 
Harvard Law School, was a proponent of this view.171 He believed that 
just as a physicist or biologist might search for immutable scientific 
truths, law professors and their students should search for the 
fundamental (and scientific) principles of law.172 Langdell argued that 
law could be simplified into “comparatively few absolute rules,”173 and 
that the scientific method should be used to search for those rules.174 
For Langdell, the scientific method involved an examination of 
 
 170. See, e.g., Charles William Eliot, President, Harvard Law Sch., Speech at the Harvard 
Law School Association (Nov. 5, 1886), in 2 CHARLES WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARVARD 
LAW SCHOOL 361 (1908); see also ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 56 (1953) (discussing the policy in greater detail); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 262 (1950) (same); Samuel F. Batchelder, 
Christopher C. Langdell, 18 GREEN BAG 437, 438 (1906) (same); Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Harvard Law School, 1 GREEN BAG 10, 19 (1889) (same); Edward J. Phelps, Methods of Legal 
Education, 1 YALE L.J. 139, 148 (1892) (same). 
 171. See Christopher Columbus Langdell, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., Speech at the 
Harvard Law School Association (Nov. 5, 1886), in WARREN, supra note 170, at 374 (illustrating 
this viewpoint). 
 172. Franklin G. Fessenden, The Rebirth of the Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 
502 (1920) (describing this sentiment); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: 
An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 581 (1987). 
 173. See Fessenden, supra note 172, at 506; Spiegel, supra note 172, at 581. 
 174. Spiegel, supra note 172, at 581–82. 
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“original sources”175—the printed reports of cases176—that students 
should study to uncover fundamental rules and principles.177 
One might assume that the appointments process would have 
been less political while Langdellian formalism was in vogue. After 
all, if law really is a science focused on unearthing the “fundamental 
rules and principles of law,” the ideology of the nominee should be 
less important. The confirmation process need only focus on whether 
the nominee is a good scientist, and therefore is capable of 
discovering and applying the “fundamental rules and principles.” If 
so, the nominee should be confirmed and should be capable of 
scientifically interpreting constitutional language and applying it to 
the facts of specific cases. 
One can debate whether Langdell really believed that law is a 
science. At the time, law schools were struggling to survive, and many 
viewed law as a craft that was best taught through the apprentice 
method.178 Within universities, there were many who questioned 
whether law was an academic discipline that was worthy of study in a 
university environment.179 By arguing that law was a “science,” in the 
same sense as the physical sciences, Langdell was able to shift the 
debate and justify the presence of law schools in a university 
environment.180 
 
 175. James Barr Ames, Professor Langdell—A View of His Career, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1906); Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1304 (1947); Ralph 
Michael Stein, The Path of Legal Education from Edward I to Langdell: A History of Insular 
Reaction, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 429, 449 (1981); Batchelder, supra note 170, at 439.  
 176. HURST, supra note 170, at 262. 
 177. See C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii 
(Lawbook Exchange 1999) (1871): 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such 
a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to 
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer; and hence 
to acquire that mastery should be the business of every earnest student of law. Each 
of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow degrees; in other words, it is 
a growth, extending in many cases through centuries. This growth is to be traced in 
the main through a series of cases. 
See also HARNO, supra note 170, at 57 (providing further explanation of this viewpoint); 
Batchelder, supra note 170, at 438–39 (same); Brandeis, supra note 170, at 19 (same); Rosamond 
Parma, The Origin, History and Compilation of the Case-book, 14 LAW LIBR. J. 14, 15 (1921) 
(same).  
 178. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 211 (1993). As a 
result, many early law schools struggled to survive. As such, Langdell’s “law as a science” 
argument might have been used simply to justify teaching law in university settings. Id.  
 179. Id. 
 180. See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. 
REV. 517, 531 (1991). 
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By the early twentieth century, attitudes regarding the nature of 
law and judging had moved in a radically different direction.181 By that 
time, Langdell’s formalistic and scientific approach to law had fallen 
under attack first by the Realists182 and then by the Critical Legal 
Studies movement.183 As time passed, it became clear that the 
Supreme Court was not simply declaring the law, or unearthing the 
“fundamental principles of law” through some sort of scientific 
method, but was engaged in law creation.184 
Even though the Court may be interpreting constitutional text, 
the difficulty is that most constitutional provisions are so vague and 
ambiguous that the Justices have great leeway in construing those 
provisions. The leeway is evident when one examines the language of 
specific constitutional provisions (such as due process, equal 
protection, freedom of speech), as well as the evidence of the 
Framers’ intent regarding those provisions. For example, does the 
Due Process Clause, which is phrased in procedural terms, have a 
substantive component?185 Likewise, does the right to equal 
 
 181. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 43 (1977) (“The jurisprudential 
premise of Langdell and his followers was that there is such a thing as the one true rule of law 
which, being discovered, will endure, without change, forever. This strange idea colored, 
explicitly or implicitly, all the vast literature which the Langdellians produced.”); Barry B. 
Boyer & Roger C. Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Reform, 
59 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 225 (1974); Weaver, supra note 180, at 545.  
 182. John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, 
or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 86 (1995); 
Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2078 (1995) (“As Grant 
Gilmore put it, ‘if Langdell had not existed, we would have had to invent him. . . . However 
absurd, however mischievous, however deeply rooted in error it may have been, Langdell’s idea 
[that law is a science] shaped our legal thinking for fifty years.’” (alterations in original) 
(quoting GILMORE, supra note 181, at 42)); Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and 
Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1456 (1990). 
 183. See Hasnas, supra note 182, at 85. 
 184. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 1316 (“Dworkin argues that judges’ subjective, value-
laden conceptions of justice are central to their adjudication, even when the judges aspire to 
absolute textual fidelity.”); see generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE 
SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 1 (2012) (suggesting 
that the Supreme Court functions more like “a political veto council” than a court). 
 185. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1. The language appears to be “procedural” because it seems to suggest that 
individuals may be deprived of “life, liberty, or property” only if they are provided with the 
procedural protection of due process of law. However, the phrase has been broadly defined to 
have a substantive component that includes, for example, the right to have an abortion. See, e.g., 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973) (“A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas 
type, that excepts from criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without 
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protection prohibit discrimination against same-sex marriages?186 
Does the Free Speech Clause prohibit hate speech,187 defamatory 
speech,188 or seditious libel?189 One can search the language and 
accompanying evidence of the Framers’ intent without finding clear 
or definitive answers to these questions. 
Part of the difficulty is that the Justices do not agree regarding 
the methodology that should be used in interpreting the Constitution. 
While some Justices are proponents of interpreting the Constitution 
according to historical analysis,190 or by reference to some touchstone 
like “original intent” or “original meaning,”191 other Justices subscribe 
to the notion of a “living Constitution.”192 With such differing 
approaches, it is no surprise that the Justices disagree regarding the 
meaning of specific constitutional provisions. As a result, the Justices 
have produced thousands of pages of opinions on a variety of issues, 
and a single phrase in a constitutional amendment can produce 
hundreds of pages of text in modern casebooks.193 In other words, the 
ideology of the judge assigned to a case can have an important impact 
on the outcome of that case.194 
If the public believes that judges are applying “neutral principles 
of law,” in the way that a Langdellian scientist might have done, the 
 
regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
 186. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).  
 187. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).  
 188. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).  
 189. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964).  
 190. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 788 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“To 
begin, while there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller’s analysis of the history of the 
right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since Heller persuades us to reopen the question 
there decided. Few other questions of original meaning have been as thoroughly explored.”). 
 191. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1835 (2014) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 192. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 899 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 290 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 307 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“We are construing a living 
Constitution.”).  
 193. Because of the realities of judicial decisionmaking, Professor Eric Segall has argued 
that “the Justices employ the fancy but misleading jargon of constitutional law (text, history, 
and prior cases) to hide the personal value judgments that actually support their decisions.” 
SEGALL, supra note 184, at 3. Professor Segall goes on to argue that the Supreme Court Justices 
“do not treat prior law in a way that generates their constitutional decisions nor do they 
consistently offer the true justifications for the results they reach.” Id.  
 194. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES 
SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2006) (analyzing the influence of ideology on judicial voting). 
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identity and, more particularly, the ideology of judicial nominees 
might be less controversial and less contentious. Understandably, 
there has been a conscious effort to conceal judicial realities from the 
public. As Judge Harry T. Edwards stated, if the public really 
understood that judicial decisionmaking is ideologically driven, there 
would be a risk that the public would lose trust in the judicial 
system.195 
Over time, however, the press and the public have come to 
realize and publicize the fact that the identity of judges is important 
to the outcome of decisions. Newspapers decry a Supreme Court that 
they regard as having a corporate bent,196 as insensitive on racial or 
minority issues,197 and as overly protective of First Amendment rights 
in the campaign-finance area.198 They also complain about what they 
regard as an activist Supreme Court,199 on which Justices are inclined 
to impose their own views of the world as they decide “legal” cases.200 
Likewise, the press sometimes cries foul when a case is assigned to a 
judge who might be seen as unsympathetic. For example, the 
Louisville Courier-Journal expressed concern recently when a same-
sex-marriage case was assigned to what it referred to as a “GOP-
leaning panel.”201 Of course, the clear implication of the article was 
that a same-sex-marriage case would receive a more hostile reception 
from a Republican-appointed panel than it would from a Democratic-
leaning panel. 
 
 195. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1336–37 (1998). 
 196. See Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
19, 2010, at A1 (“[A] liberal group . . . found that the positions supported by the [C]hamber [of 
Commerce] prevailed 68 percent of the time in the Roberts court, compared with 56 percent in 
the last 11 years of the Rehnquist court, a period without changes in the court’s membership.”).  
 197. See Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed., The Next Nine Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/opinion/the-next-nine-years.html (“It has been an eventful 
nine terms for the court and its chief. Samuel A. Alito Jr . . .  has provided Chief Justice Roberts 
with a reliable if narrow majority for the court’s steady regression on race and its deregulatory 
hijacking of the First Amendment.”).  
 198. See id. 
 199. Adam Liptak, How Activist Is the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013 (Sunday 
Review), at 4. 
 200. See Jeff Shesol, Rightward Bound, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, at BR10 (“It is not a 
coincidence that the labels that many detractors apply to the court under Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts Jr. are the same ones they attach to Scalia: ‘stuck in the past,’ ‘pro-business,’ 
‘disconnected from the real world.’”). 
 201. See Andrew Wolfson, Gay Marriage Appeals Get GOP-Leaning Panel, COURIER-
JOURNAL (July 23, 2014, 10:14 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2014/07/23/
kentucky-gay-marriage-appeal-heard-panel-conservative-judges/13016615. 
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Public awareness of the nature of judicial decisionmaking is 
further enhanced by media outlets emphasizing the fact that the 
ideology of Supreme Court Justices can affect the outcome of cases. 
Media emphasis on the Justices’ ideologies further enhances public 
awareness of the potential politics behind judicial decisionmaking. 
For example, a recent National Public Radio (NPR) program on the 
Supreme Court focused extensively on the ideological leanings of the 
current Justices,202 and the future composition of the Court.203 One 
commentator asked whether one of the more liberal Justices might 
choose to retire “while there is still a Democratic president in 
office.”204 Of course, the clear implication of such speculation is that a 
liberal president would be more likely to nominate a liberal Justice, 
and thereby preserve liberal seats on the Court. If that implication 
were not clear enough, the commentator then asked NPR legal 
correspondent Nina Totenberg whether Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
would opt to retire before President Obama left office.205 Totenberg 
doubted that Justice Ginsburg would choose to retire,206 noting that 
Justice Ginsburg sees no reason to retire “when there is little if any 
likelihood that President Obama could get through the Senate 
somebody who she would like to have replace her.”207 
As the press has emphasized the political nature of judicial 
decisionmaking, the public has begun to take the nomination process 
seriously and to view the confirmation process as political. The defeat 
of the Bork nomination reflected the fact that the public understands 
the importance of ideology. Today, there are a number of hot-button 
issues that have made their way to the federal courts, and in 
particular to the Supreme Court, including cases involving abortion,208 
campaign finance,209 immigration,210 affirmative action,211 same-sex 
 
 202. See Ari Shapiro, For Now, Court Stays Mum on Gay Marriage Cases, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Oct. 5, 2014, 7:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/05/353849497/for-now-court-stays-
mum-on-gay-marriage-cases (interviewing Nina Totenberg, NPR legal correspondent). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. (“Justice Ginsburg most recently said that she’s not about to retire. That she’ll keep 
doing this job as long as she can do it well.”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).  
 209. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310, 372 (2010).  
 210. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).  
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marriage,212 religious exemptions to federal laws,213 electoral 
redistricting,214 and the Voting Rights Act.215 Moreover, the Court’s 
Affordable Care Act decision in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius216 presented important issues regarding whether 
the federal government could impose a health-insurance mandate, as 
well as issues relating to the federal government’s taxing and 
spending power, and the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
and the Commerce Clause.217 Same-sex marriage, voter identification, 
and early-voting laws are among other hot-button issues working 
their way toward the Supreme Court.218 
Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the judicial-
appointments process has become an intensely political process.219 If 
law is regarded as indeterminate and judges are viewed as 
policymakers, the public is likely to be intensely interested in the 
appointment and confirmation process. Senators, being electorally 
accountable, can be expected to respond to the concerns of 
constituents regarding judicial nominees. As a result, one could have 
expected Democratic senators to balk when President George W. 
Bush nominated federal judges they regarded as conservative 
ideologues.220 Likewise, one should expect Republicans to balk if 
 
 211. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014); Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
 212. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).  
 213. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).  
 214. See Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 944 (2012).  
 215. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 216. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 217. See generally id. 
 218. See Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming a district court’s preliminary injunction against an Ohio early-voting law); True the 
Vote v. Hosemann, No. 3:14-CV-532-NFA, 2014 WL 4273332, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2014) 
(interpreting the National Voter Registration Act regarding the mandatory disclosure of certain 
voting records). 
 219. See Jeremy W. Peters, White House Steps Up Effort to Confirm Federal Judges, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 29, 2014, at A13 (“‘Conservatives accepted decades ago that the selection of federal 
judges is a 100 percent political process,’ said Robert Raben, a political consultant who works 
with the White House and Democrats on nominees. ‘Progressives have been very slow to accept 
that fact.’” (quoting Robert Raben)).  
 220. See Savage, supra note 150 (“The use of the filibuster to require a 60-vote 
supermajority to confirm an appeals court nominee arose out of the bitter aftermath of the 
disputed 2000 presidential election, when Senate Democrats used the tactic to deny lifetime 
appointments for several of President George W. Bush’s nominees.”).  
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President Obama nominates judges they regard as too liberal,221 and it 
should not be surprising that senators sometimes move to block 
nominees who are unwilling to reveal their political or judicial 
biases.222 
Public understanding of the nature of the confirmation process 
has led interest groups to treat the confirmation process politically. 
When an individual who is politically objectionable is nominated to 
the judiciary, interest groups mobilize to influence the Senate and 
thwart the nomination.223 Interest groups employ a range of tactics, 
including researching nominees’ positions, lobbying senators, 
providing information to the media, arranging television advertising 
campaigns, sending opposition mailings, and organizing constituent 
letters and phone calls.224 In the case of the Bork nomination, interest 
groups were concerned about Bork’s positions on civil rights225 and on 
abortion,226 and immediately galvanized and actively opposed his 
nomination.227 Similarly, as previously discussed, Clarence Thomas 
was criticized during his nomination because of his political beliefs 
and because of sexual harassment allegations against him.228 Not only 
have these constituent efforts increased in quantity, they have also 
increased in effectiveness.229 For example, anticipating a possible Bork 
 
 221. See id. 
 222. See Withdrawal of the Estrada Nomination, 149 CONG. REC. 21,977 (statement of Sen. 
Leahy); see also Neil A. Lewis, A Filibuster Resembling Those of Decades Past, N.Y. TIMES, 
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been named . . . as part of [a] White House plan to shift the courts to the right.”). 
 223. See Neil A. Lewis, Gay Rights Groups Join Opposition to Ashcroft for Justice Dept., 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001, at A15 (stating that gay-rights organizations, such as the Human 
Rights Campaign, planned to express opposition to the nomination of John Ashcroft for 
Attorney General). 
 224. See id. (describing efforts of gay-rights groups to influence Democratic senators’ 
decisions over whether to oppose Ashcroft’s nomination). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Andrew Rosenthal, Bork Fight Gives Abortion Rights Convention Something to 
Shout About, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1987, at A12 (stating that Bork’s nomination caused an 
abortion-rights convention to radically shift into a session “charged with activist fervor”). 
 227. See Greenhouse, supra note 145 (describing the public’s reaction to the Supreme Court 
vacancy, and liberal groups’ anticipation that a Reagan nominee would hold interests contrary 
to their own). 
 228. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 310–11 (describing Justice Thomas’s techniques for 
avoiding Bork’s mistakes). 
 229. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 14 (“Observers of the Supreme Court confirmation 
process have suggested that interest group opposition has not only grown, but has also been 
effective in preventing confirmations. The impact of interest group opposition relative to other 
factors is a matter of continuing study.”). 
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nomination by President Ronald Reagan, civil-rights groups started 
researching Bork’s record for some time prior to his nomination.230 
V.  THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS AND NONJUDICIAL NOMINEES 
The indeterminacy of law helps explain why President Obama 
has encountered difficulties in gaining confirmation of his judicial 
nominees, but it does not explain his difficulties in obtaining the 
Senate’s confirmation of ambassador and other executive-branch 
appointees. As noted, throughout U.S. history, even though 
Presidents have sometimes encountered difficulties obtaining 
confirmation for their judicial appointments, particularly for Supreme 
Court nominees, they have had comparatively little difficulty gaining 
confirmation for their executive-branch appointments. 
So, what has changed? One answer might be an increased 
polarization between the primary political parties. In fact, Congress 
has become noticeably more politically partisan in recent years due to 
a shifting political landscape.231 In the aftermath of the Great 
Depression, the Watergate scandal, and the Vietnam War, the 
Democratic party held a solid and seemingly unshakeable grip on 
Congress.232 However, it was bolstered by Southern Democrats who 
tended to be more conservative than the party as a whole.233 As a 
result, Democratic losses in the confirmation process occurred when 
more conservative Southern Democrats rebelled against the party 
position.234 Over time, the dynamics of the electorate began to change 
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 231. See Robin Toner, Southern Democrats’ Decline Is Eroding the Political Center, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at A1 (discussing the possibility that the loss of Southern Democrats 
might polarize the party and Congress). 
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VAND. L. REV. 291, 294 (1997) (discussing the relationship between black enfranchisement and 
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(describing the double-edged sword of accountability that arises when a political party assumes 
power during a crisis). 
 233. See Karlan, supra note 232, at 321; see also Nate Cohn, Why a Democratic Majority Has 
Yet to Materialize, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2014, at A3 (“The collapse of Democratic support 
among Southern whites threatens the party’s ability to control government and enact its agenda. 
Democrats will find it extremely hard to retake the House without reclaiming the majority 
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 234. See HOGUE, supra note 14, at 8–12. 
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as more conservative Democrats either retired or were defeated by 
Republicans, who ultimately took most Southern seats.235 
In recent years, there have been fewer and fewer seats that are 
“in play” for both parties, so-called “swing seats,” in the House of 
Representatives.236 Many districts are now considered “safe” because 
either the Republican party or the Democratic party is virtually 
assured victory in that district from election to election, and because 
the districts do not generate competitive races between members of 
different political parties.237 The net effect is that the battle for such 
districts is primarily fought in primary races in which the contest is 
between a more-moderate Democrat (or Republican) and a more-
radical one,238 and many politicians are more fearful about a challenge 
from the left (for Democrats) or from the right (for Republicans) 
than they are about a challenge from the opposing party.239 As the 
number of congressional swing seats has diminished, those who 
prevail (on both the left and the right) tend to be more radical in their 
views.240 
There are a number of possible explanations for these decidedly 
partisan districts. Some blame the gerrymandering of congressional 
districts to make them more lopsided in favor of one party, hence the 
reduction of “swing districts.”241 Another possible explanation is that 
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Rep. Tanner); Nicholas M. Goedert, Redistricting, Risk, and Representation: How Five State 
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there has been an effort in recent years to create more “minority” 
districts  to ensure that more minority representatives are elected to 
the House of Representatives.242 The creation of new minority 
districts requires siphoning minority voters from neighboring areas 
into highly concentrated congressional districts. While newly created 
minority districts may lean heavily Democratic, surrounding districts 
may lean heavily Republican. As a result, in minority districts the 
primary battle is fought among a decidedly Democratic constituency, 
with a Republican candidate having little chance of prevailing, and 
the surrounding districts involve battles between Republican 
candidates.243 The net effect is that the Democratic minority districts 
elect more liberal Democratic representatives and the surrounding 
districts elect more conservative Republican representatives. As a 
result, there is very little communication between the increasingly 
liberal and increasingly conservative representatives, and little middle 
ground.244 
Of course, the Senate is charged with confirming presidential 
nominees, not the House of Representatives. However, as the House 
becomes more divided along ideological lines, the Senate has 
increasingly been drawn into the fray.245 As Congress’s, or either 
House’s, political-party support has shifted back and forth in recent 
decades, the political parties have positioned themselves for political 
advantage.246 The result has been unbridled partisanship. During the 
Clinton administration, for example, President Clinton was 
impeached by the House of Representatives and forced to stand trial 
in the Senate.247 Arguably, the impeachment proceedings were 
politically motivated. President Bush encountered very substantial 
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opposition and hostility from the Democrats.248 During the first six 
years of the Obama administration, political partisanship has reached 
new highs with gridlock over a variety of issues, including taxing and 
spending.249 At one point, then–Senate Minority Leader Mitch 
McConnell even vowed that his goal was to ensure that President 
Obama would be a one-term president.250 
In such a bitterly divided political environment, it should come as 
no great surprise that the Senate confirmation process, including 
nominations of ambassadors and executive-branch officials, has 
become contentious. Indeed, it would have been surprising if senators 
had chosen not to do battle with each other. In addition, some believe 
that a tit-for-tat mentality has developed between the Senate and the 
President.251 Republicans managed to best President Obama in budget 
negotiations, so President Obama retaliated by trying to best the 
Republicans in subsequent negotiations.252 Inevitably, this tit-for-tat 
scenario creeps into the Senate’s confirmation processes. As one 
commentator noted, “When I asked a former Republican Senate staff 
member to explain why so many qualified Obama administration 
nominees were being denied confirmation hearings, he told me, ‘We 
are tatting.’”253 Whether this dynamic will remain in the new Congress 
with Republicans in control, remains to be seen. 
CONCLUSION 
It wasn’t supposed to be easy. Though it might be desirable to 
have an appointments process that is smooth and effective, it is not 
clear that the Framers desired such a system. Although the founding 
generation accepted the concept of democracy, as reflected in the 
Declaration of Independence’s reference to the idea that legitimate 
governmental power is grounded in the “consent of the governed,” 
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they were simultaneously distrustful of governmental power. The 
Framers exhibited this distrust when they created a governmental 
structure that was more cumbersome and less efficient than 
competing governmental systems. By incorporating Montesquieu’s 
notions of separation of powers and checks and balances, the Framers 
embedded a level of inefficiency into the system that did not exist in 
other competing governmental systems such as England’s. 
Both in theory and practice, the advice-and-consent formulation 
for presidential appointments reflects the citizenry’s distrust of 
government. The President was not given the unfettered power to 
make appointments, but was forced to seek the advice and consent of 
the Senate. Although the Senate’s approach to confirmation issues 
has sometimes been deferential, the process has at other times been 
contentious and ideologically driven. For over two-hundred years of 
the nation’s existence, it has not been at all uncommon for 
presidential nominees, especially nominees to the Supreme Court, to 
be challenged because of their ideological perspectives, and at times 
denied Senate confirmation. Therefore, to the extent that the 
appointments process is difficult, it is an intentionally imposed 
difficulty. 
Thus, although some may view Robert Bork’s Senate 
repudiation as exceptional, and as having led to a more contentious 
Senate-confirmation process, the Bork nomination can hardly be 
regarded as aberrational. Over the last two-hundred-plus years, there 
have been numerous instances in which a nominee was denied 
confirmation because of his ideological views, including as far back as 
the eighteenth century. The confirmation process might be 
particularly difficult or problematic currently because of the high 
level of partisanship on Capitol Hill, which has made it difficult for 
President Obama to obtain confirmation for even his executive-
branch and ambassadorial appointments during his final two years in 
office. However, the current situation is a matter of degree rather 
than a reflection of a fundamental shift in the nature of the 
confirmation process. 
 
